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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy. Housed at Georgetown University Law
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic
diseases to health care financing and health systems. The Institute, a joint project of the Law
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the
Kennedy Institute of Ethics.
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global,
national, and local communities. By contributing to a more powerful and deeper
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decisionmakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives.


Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys,
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor. The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural,
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems.



Scholarship. O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems,
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a
scientific endeavor.



Reflective Problem-Solving. For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent
and knowledge that resides in academia.
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OVERVIEW
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern. In order
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health
reform. In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management,
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised. Due to the diverse interests involved, these
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates. Therefore, it is critical that
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform. In an effort to
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate. While other academic and research
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health
reform. The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other
key players. This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.

LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policybased and those that are legally-based. Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and
cannot be considered in isolation. However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or
prohibition.
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services. In contrast, legal issues are
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict.
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning
with, “Can we…?” The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?” This
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat
of political debate. This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems
addressed are either soluble or avoidable. Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or
make recommendations among them. Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for
resolving those questions.

LEGAL ISSUES
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press,
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal
health reform. After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten. An initial framing paper was drafted which identified
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each. In May of 2008, a
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and
framing of the legal issues. The attendees of the consultation session included congressional
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide
range of interests affected by health reform. Feedback and analysis from this session further
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current
law.
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is
adopted, the system changes. In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute
INTRODUCTION:
Proposals to allow the purchase of insurance across state lines (PASL) have gained some
support in recent years. Health insurers have traditionally been allowed to sell a policy
only within the state that approved and regulates that particular policy. PASL would
allow insurers to sell a policy approved in one state to people residing in any state.
Any federal legislation to enact PASL in an individual insurance market would have to
address two main legal considerations: 1) the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which allows the
states to retain their regulatory authority over insurance, and 2) a constitutional
prohibition against the commandeering of state officials by the federal government. This
paper outlines these obstacles and potential solutions, and concludes that as long as the
legislation is thoughtfully drafted (see below), there is no significant legal or
Constitutional barrier to enacting PASL. Additionally, the concepts discussed here may
be relevant to any federal health reform legislation involving regulation of health
insurance or the use of state officials.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:
 Congressional Authority under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: The federal
McCarran-Ferguson Act delineates the respective roles of the federal and state
governments in regulating health insurance. While states retain the primary role in
regulating health insurance, the federal government can preempt state laws in this
area if it does so explicitly and clearly, or if a federal law specifically relates to the
business of insurance. PASL legislation is most likely to survive a potential court
challenge to Congress’ authority if it includes both of the following two steps:

 Clearly state that Congress is using its Commerce Clause power: Courts have
historically been very deferential to Congress when it is legislating under its
Commerce Clause authority, increasing the chance that the legislation would be
upheld. A clear statement of Commerce Clause jurisdiction in legislation would
make this authority clear to the Court.

 Ensure that the legislation meets the legal preemption standard: The
legislation could expressly state that the law preempts state laws on the subject.
Alternatively, Congress could include clear language ensuring that the legislation
specifically relates to the business of insurance, which would meet the Supreme
Court test for preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.


Commandeering of State Officials: The federal government is prohibited under the
Constitution from requiring state officials to implement or enforce federal law, or
“commandeering” those state officials. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the federal government can regulate interstate commerce, so long as state officials are
not required to alter their actions as a result. Congress can also attach conditions or
requirements to federal money it grants to the states.
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For a PASL proposal, concerns about commandeering challenges can be minimized by
Congress’ taking the following steps:

 Impose No New Duties: Congress should make the strongest case possible that
any responsibilities modified by the PASL legislation do not impose new duties
on state officials. Additionally, Congress could characterize the participation of
states as “primary states” in PASL as voluntary.

 Use Congress’s Spending Power: If Congress provides new funding to states to
incentivize them to participate in a PASL program, it can rely on its
Constitutional spending power and can attach requirements on the states’
participation. Use of the relatively broad spending power can minimize any
commandeering concerns.
LEGAL ISSUES & APPLICABLE LAW:
 McCarran-Ferguson Act: Ordinarily, where a state and federal law conflict, the
federal law preempts (takes priority over) the state law. The federal McCarranFerguson Act, by contrast, re-affirms the role of the states as the primary regulators of
the insurance industry while preserving federal authority to regulate insurance if it
acts specifically to do so. If Congress wishes to preempt state health insurance law, it
can explicitly declare that a particular piece of legislation preempts state law, or draft
the legislation to fit under the exception provided by the Act for legislation
specifically relating to the business of insurance.


Commandeering of State Officials: The Tenth Amendment and the principle of
state sovereignty in the Constitution prohibit the federal government from
commanding the states to implement federal law or policies that would interfere with
state sovereignty. This is referred to as the “anti-commandeering” principle. A
PASL bill could minimize this constitutional concern by characterizing duties of state
officials as consistent with existing duties and by providing incentives to states
through funding, as opposed to requiring state participation.

CONCLUSION:
PASL legislation can be implemented, if it addresses key legal issues using the solutions
outlined above. McCarran-Ferguson concerns can be addressed by carefully crafting the
legislation with explicit references to the insurance industry, or by including a specific
statement of preemption. Concerns about the commandeering of state officials can be
curtailed by drafting the legislation so that state officials are not given additional duties,
and by providing financial incentives to the states to enforce the federal law.
Policymakers should keep in mind that the solutions above, in addition to being relevant
to PASL proposals, may also be relevant to any federal legislation involving the federal
regulation of health insurance or that requires specific action by state officials.
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform:
The Purchase of Insurance Across State Lines in the Individual Market
Stephanie Kanwit 1
Introduction
This paper analyzes the legal issues associated with the leading and much-debated proposals that
aim to revitalize state regulatory competition and allow individuals to purchase insurance across
state lines (PASL). These proposals seek to reverse decades-old principles of state preeminence
in the regulation of individual health insurance and instead create “jurisdictional competition” in
the individual market by allowing an insurer to choose the state under whose law it wishes to be
regulated, subject to certain consumer protections. Advocates say this type of jurisdictional
competition would reform perceived problems in the individual market and lower the costs of
individual health insurance by imposing the regulatory authority of only the insurer’s selected
“home” state.
Supporters of PASL legislation cite the perceived advantages of greater competition, a reduction
in the costs of regulation, and additional consumer choice. For example, the health care reform
program of the former Republican presidential nominee, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) featured a
PASL proposal along with modifications to the tax treatment of employer sponsored coverage,
tax credits, and funding of guaranteed access plans. 2 In fact, legislation authorizing PASL was
introduced in both the 109th and 110th Congresses by Representative Shadegg (R-AZ) 3 , allowing
insurers to select a “primary” state to govern the policy, but also giving a “secondary” state
authority to enforce certain consumer protections as well as collect premium taxes. 4
In accordance with the ground rules for the Legal Solutions in Health Reform project, this paper
does not take a position on the merits of PASL as a component of health care reform. As we
discovered over the course of the Presidential campaign season, the various supporters and
opponents of PASL have articulated these views in some detail, and we anticipate further
discussion of this approach. 5 Instead, this paper explores the legal as well as practical legislative
issues associated with potential federal legislation to allow PASL. Note that for space
limitations, this paper focuses on the individual market for health insurance as opposed to
insured group markets, although many of the same fundamental legal issues would apply.
Part I summarizes the issues that PASL legislation seeks to address and discusses the current
regulatory framework of health insurance to provide background as to how PASL could alter the
regulatory environment. Part II outlines these leading federal proposals, as well as touches
briefly on analogous state efforts. Whether these proposals can be implemented is addressed in
the second half of the paper, with Part III discussing two basic legal issues that may arise from
PASL proposals: how to draft any legislative language to both (1) avoid running afoul of the
federal McCarran-Ferguson Act 6 , and (2) avoid improperly requiring state insurance departments
to enforce new federal standards and thus possibly violating the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution, as well as solutions for minimizing these possible legal problems.
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I. Current Regulatory Environment
Today, more than 230 million Americans access health care coverage through their employers or
through government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Most non-elderly individuals
receive private health coverage through health and welfare benefit plans sponsored by
employers; in 2006, about 158 million non-elderly people were insured through employersponsored insurance. A significant number, however, purchase insurance on their own in the
individual market: one estimate puts the number at over 17 million in 2007. 7 The number of
individuals who are currently uninsured is estimated at over 45 million. 8 The true intended
audience of a PASL proposal will likely vary, however, depending on how and whether the
proposal is linked with the offer of incentives or disincentives for employer-based coverage. For
example, some proposals – such as those offered by Senator McCain eliminating the favorable
tax treatment of health insurance benefits provided to workers when coupled with a PASL
proposal – could have the effect of increasing coverage in the individual market but only at the
expense of diminishing employer-based coverage. 9
Proposals to allow PASL are based on the assumption that state mandated benefits, state rating
rules, and state regulatory regimes distort pricing and result in decreased uptake of insurance by
price-sensitive consumers in the individual market. Under current law, companies may only sell
policies to individuals who reside or work in the state in which the company is licensed
(although large insurers license products in every state). So, for example, a New Jersey resident
has no choice but to purchase a policy from a carrier licensed in that state and that carrier can
only sell that resident a policy compliant with all the state’s mandates as well as its guaranteed
issue and community rating requirements. But because of the variation in state requirements
regarding guaranteed issue, mandates, and rating rules, as well as state demographics, there is a
tremendously wide price variation in individual policies. According to a recent nationwide
survey, annual premiums averaged $5,326 for single coverage in New Jersey in the 2006-2007
period, but only $1,254 in Wisconsin. 10 Contrast the cost of a New Jersey individual policy –
$5,326 – with that of a Connecticut policy, where the average cost would be much lower, $3,326.
The national average cost of such a policy was $2,613. 11
A particular New Jersey consumer, however, looking to purchase insurance in the individual
market might feel that the state’s extensive regulation was “worth it,” especially if he or she has
medical issues, since no one can be turned down for coverage in the individual market, and the
particular mandates for certain “high-cost” benefits will cause the cost to be spread out across a
large community-rated pool. In contrast, the relatively younger New Jersey resident without
health conditions might prefer a cheaper product rated for his or her individual risk as it would
be in other states. Supporters of PASL proposals argue a solution to this problem is to create a
national market for individual health insurance to allow for greater competition by insurers, a
greater choice in the types of plans available to individuals, and consequentially lower prices as a
result of decreased mandates, less-expensive rating rules, and a more favorable regulatory
environment. 12 Supporters point to historical analogies such as Delaware corporate chartering,
dual banking charters, regional compacts for banking, the Risk Retention Act, regulation of
surplus lines insurance, and association health plans. 13
Consumer advocates, on the other hand, are concerned lest PASL proposals have the effect of
circumventing state consumer protections by producing a regulatory “race to the bottom,” with
insurers selecting the least regulated state with the fewest mandates as their primary state.
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Opponents further note the adverse consumer impact, in that insurers remaining in states with
more mandates will necessarily be forced to increase costs as a result of individuals requiring
those mandated benefits remaining in the secondary state’s pool.
The dissenting Democrats summarized their concerns with the Choice Act at the hearing before
the House Subcommittee on Health in 2005 – namely, that the legislation would erode consumer
protections, since “[s]tates would be powerless to stop out-of-State insurance companies from
selling coverage in their State which did not meet important State consumer and benefit
protections.” 14 The protections cited included access to emergency care and specialty care,
mandated benefits such as maternity coverage, and enforcement of state fraud and abuse laws.
Others have reiterated that restrictions on state authority would probably create a greater risk of
fraud and abuse, requiring a state (for example) to turn to the courts to shut down an insurance
company regulated by another “primary” state rather than use the current more expedited
administrative process. 15 There is also the problem created by a primary state’s regulators’
having to provide assistance to consumers living in a (much-smaller) secondary state, such as the
difficulties that might await a California consumer who buys a policy from a company licensed
in Delaware and is then forced to seek protection from “a regulator some 3,000 miles away and
staffed to regulate insurance markets on a much smaller population scale.” 16
The witnesses testifying in favor of the Choice Act, conversely, emphasized that the bill was
indeed “pro-consumer” in that it provided an option for those who cannot “afford all the
services and ‘protections’ prescribed by their state,” in the form of mandates and community
rating, for example. 17 These pro-PASL witnesses assured the Committee that the bill contained
adequate consumer protections, including requirements regarding disclosure, requirements
relating to the insurer’s financial stability, and the availability of an independent review
mechanism. 18 The testimony also noted the current reality of a mobile and decentralized
workforce, made possible by the Internet and other communication tools, rendering state-based
insurance regulation an anachronism in some cases. 19
Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office has weighed in since the Choice Act hearing in
the House with a cautionary note: that the very virtue of any PASL proposal – its goal of
increasing access to the individual market – may turn out to be its Achilles heel if it is not
carefully designed. The increase in individual market uptake may reduce the number of people
who are covered by employer-sponsored coverage, the CBO notes in its assessment of the
Choice Act, since: (1) some employers (especially smaller employers) would stop offering
coverage because individual market coverage would become less expensive; and (2) some
employees with low health care costs might opt to purchase this less expensive coverage in the
individual market. Thus, the resulting increase in the per-person cost of the remaining
employees in the group might cause employers to drop coverage. 20
In order to understand the state “patchwork” of insurance law that PASL supporters are seeking
to address, it is necessary to understand the historical framework of insurance regulation.
A. State Insurance Regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act
States have historically had the primary role in regulation of insurance products. This role was
reaffirmed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 (McCarran-Ferguson Act), 21 enacted in
response to the Supreme Court decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n,
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holding that insurance activity which crossed state lines was interstate commerce and subject to
the federal antitrust laws. 22 Faced with the prospect of federal antitrust penalties for
commonplace and arguably pro-competitive insurer activities, the insurance industry joined with
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to obtain passage of McCarranFerguson.
The Act had two aims: (1) to re-affirm the role of the states as the primary regulators of the
insurance industry while preserving federal authority to regulate insurance through “specific”
enactments; and (2) to provide limited federal antitrust immunity for the insurance industry. 23
The relevant statutory language is as follows:
(a) State regulation
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to
the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, that . . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the
Clayton Act, and the . . . Federal Trade Commission Act, shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
Law. 24
While the Act specifies that “silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose
any barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the business of insurance] by the several states,”
explicit wording in a federal statute could still allow federal law to trump a state’s authority to
act. 25
In response to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, states have developed comprehensive regulation of
the “business of insurance,” including licensing, market conduct, financial solvency, policy
language, underwriting standards, agent licensing, receivership, and (in some cases) pricing of
coverage. States have also used the limited antitrust immunity under the Act to develop various
forms of rate regulation, often in the form of model laws developed by the NAIC. To protect
consumers, all states have also adopted unfair trade practices laws to regulate not only insurer
but also producer marketing and advertising activities.
B. State Regulation: Rating, Mandated Benefits, Regulatory Regimes
The states’ authority to regulate health plans and health insurers is limited by federal law under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 26 which specifically preempts
any state regulation of employer self-funded group products and provides for uniformity in
certain areas for group plans insured through state-regulated insurers. ERISA does, however,
allow the states to regulate the “business of insurance” and hence health insurance policies
purchased by employers. 27 In addition to ERISA, the states’ authority is also limited by other
federal reforms – most notably, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) – which created certain minimum insurance protections for both federally-regulated
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and traditionally state-regulated coverage. 28 Two of its provisions are especially relevant: (1)
guaranteed renewal, requiring that all health coverage (individual and group) be renewable upon
expiration of the policy term; 29 and (2) group-to-individual portability, guaranteeing eligible
individuals losing group coverage access to coverage through individually-purchased insurance
or alternatives, such as state-sponsored high-risk pools. 30
But at the same time it imposed a “floor” of federal protections in certain areas on states, HIPAA
also gave the states substantial flexibility in determining the mechanism for making coverage
available to those eligible and for enforcing the insurance-related portions of that federal statute
for both the group and individual markets. Thus, states could opt to apply the “federal fallback”
approach or develop an alternative mechanism that: (1) offers a choice of guaranteed access
coverage to all eligible individuals; (2) imposes no preexisting condition exclusions; and (3)
adopts one of several approaches relating to risk spreading, including a standard high-risk pool
approach (which includes a 200% premium cap) and any other approach that provides for risk
adjustment, risk spreading, or a financial subsidy to eligible individuals. 31 In most states,
eligible individuals are guaranteed access to coverage in the state’s high-risk pool.
That substantial flexibility left to the states by HIPAA – consistent with the primacy of state
regulation of insurance – has left, and in some areas even increased, considerable state-by-state
variation in, for example, how those risk pools work and how effective guaranteed renewability
is when coverage may be unaffordable. The key driver to PASL proposals is to minimize that
widely varying state regulation in the individual market, on the assumption that the divergence of
state regulatory regimes imposes considerable additional costs for those purchasing in the
individual market. State regulation often involves more than one entity in the same state, as well
as laws and regulations that are at significant variance with each other. Supporters of state
regulation, however, argue that such costs for state oversight – including market conduct
examinations, corrective actions for insurers, and establishing state guaranty funds in case of
insurer insolvency – are valuable, since they assure that individuals are best protected by local
regulators and responsive elected officials.
Under the various PASL proposals, health insurance issuers could offer individual policies of
insurance from any state regardless of the residence state of the individual purchaser, subject to
the primary state’s mandated benefit laws, rating laws (including community rating, for
example), guaranteed issue, and guaranteed renewal laws. The mandated benefits requirements
and rules affecting the extent to which insurers may charge different prices for coverage offered
to individuals are anticipated to have the greatest effect on the price of individual health
coverage – assuming that the cost of care is constant across all geographic areas.
The following is a short description of three key areas of state regulatory variation identified by
supporters of PASL proposals: 1) Community rating and guaranteed issue; 2) Mandated benefits;
and 3) General regulatory regimes.
1. Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue
A minority of states have attempted to make health coverage more accessible in the individual
market by enacting “guaranteed issue” and “community rating” reforms, which forbid age-based
premiums differentials and medical underwriting for new policies. Under community rating,
insurers generally are not allowed to vary rates based on the health or claims of a business or
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person, although adjusted or modified community rating can permit adjustments for such factors
as geographic location and age. 32 “Guaranteed issue” requirements prohibit insurers from
denying coverage to individuals based on health status, and currently five states require all
insurers to sell coverage to all applicants in the individual market on a guaranteed issue basis. 33
As a result of the passage of HIPAA in 1996, all insurers are required to sell their small group
policies on a guaranteed issue basis, but in the individual market, when not linked with an
individual mandate, such laws may encourage healthy individuals to remain uninsured until
health care coverage is needed.
These reforms tend to create subsidies for older and/or less healthy individuals while resulting in
higher premiums for younger/healthier individuals. States with either guaranteed issue or
community rating rules tend to have higher than average premiums because younger and
healthier people are incentivized to avoid purchasing insurance until they become ill, allowing
the insurance pools to be disproportionately represented by higher cost individuals. Supporters
of these reforms contend that this subsidy is necessary to ensure accessible coverage to all
regardless of health or age.
In most states, premiums for individual coverage are allowed to vary by age, which can
encourage younger people to purchase coverage, as well as by gender. Likewise, most states
allow insurers to medically underwrite new applications for coverage, which involves a process
to assess risks and classify them according to degrees of insurability so that appropriate rates
may be assigned to discernable categories of risk. Underwriting can discourage individuals from
waiting until they are ill to purchase insurance, thereby assuring the pool of insured individuals
within each discernable category has a mix of those who are more healthy and less healthy,
which serves to spread the risk of claims across the entire population, and assure more level
premiums.
2. Mandated benefits and access
There are very few federal mandates on health policies in the individual market. 34 States,
however, have enacted a wide variety of laws mandating which categories of individuals must be
covered by an insurer, which benefits must be covered, and which practitioners must be allowed
to deliver medical treatment and services. The Council for Affordable Health Insurance (CAHI)
issued a report in 2008 listing over 1900 state mandates applicable to individual and small group
These mandates can include: (1) provider mandates such as inclusion of
policies. 35
chiropractors and acupuncturists; (2) benefit mandates such as the inclusion of prescription
drugs, well-child care, infertility services, and hearing aids; and (3) covered classes of insureds,
such as dependent students and grandchildren.
Many forces drive the push to introduce and enact mandates, including guaranteed third-party
reimbursement for providers and additional coverage for individuals with a particular disease or
condition. 36 Estimates of costs imposed by such mandates vary greatly. CAHI has developed
estimate ranges for each of the state mandates, ranging from less than 1% to between 5-10% of
additional cost. While the costs of a specific mandate may be low, the accumulation of 40 or 50
mandates in a state may price certain individuals out of the market. Critics of mandates note that
mandates ultimately harm consumer health by imposing static clinical procedures, despite the
dynamic nature of changing clinical “best practices,” and by raising the cost of health insurance
and thus contributing to the number of uninsured Americans. 37
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A growing number of states, recognizing that mandates are not cost-free, are requiring
systematic review of either state mandates or of proposed mandate legislation. The
Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy, for example, estimated the total
spending on the state’s 26 mandated benefits at $1.32 billion, or 12% of premiums for the oneyear study period (July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005). The true net cost impact of mandated
benefits, however, was estimated to be significantly lower (in the range of 3-4% of premiums)
because of federal mandate laws and the likely behavior of insurers and employers in the absence
of state mandates. 38
3. Regulatory regimes for insurers
States also vary in terms of the regulatory regimes they choose to impose on insurers in the
individual market. One area in which there is significant variation is in the area of external
review – also known as independent medical review. External review laws provide a mechanism
for resolving health care coverage disputes between consumers and their health insurance plans
by providing a formal process that allows an appeal of coverage determinations to a third party.
Currently, 44 states and the District of Columbia have external review programs that apply to
private health insurance plans, usually in both the group 39 and individual markets. 40
From an administrative standpoint, however, the scope of these state external review laws differs
widely. Some apply to medical necessity determinations 41 , while others, for example, have
external review laws that are broader and cover determinations involving experimental services
or treatments, or even payment denials for providers. 42 Other states, such as Arizona and
Washington, apply external review to any adverse determination affecting coverage. 43 Process
requirements also vary widely in terms of time frames, the nature of the review, the
qualifications of the reviewer(s), and whether an adverse decision is binding on the insurer.
II. Leading Federal PASL Proposals
PASL proposals attempt to solve the administrative complexities and inefficiencies that can arise
in state-by-state regulation and help correct what proponents see as resulting distortions in
pricing which may discourage younger and healthier consumers from purchasing individual
insurance. The leading federal PASL proposal is the Choice Act, introduced by Representative
Shadegg in the last two Congresses. 44 Companion bills were introduced by Senator Jim DeMint
(R-SC) in the Senate. 45
In brief, the various versions of the Choice Act would amend the federal Public Health Service
Act to provide that the laws of the state designated by a health insurance issuer (the “primary”
state) would apply to individual insurance coverage offered by that issuer in the primary state
and in any other state (“secondary” state), so long as the coverage and the issuer comply with the
provisions of the Act. The Act’s provisions would specify which types of state laws apply, thus
requiring that the primary state’s law would apply to mandated benefit laws, rating laws
(including community rating, for example), guaranteed issue, and guaranteed renewal laws. To
avoid duplication, the Act would give sole jurisdiction to the primary state to enforce its covered
laws in the primary state as well as in any secondary state.
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The secondary state, however, would retain authority in certain specific areas: (a) levying
nondiscriminatory premium and other taxes, (b) requiring compliance with lawful orders in
relation to delinquency proceedings in the case of financial impairment, (c) requiring compliance
with injunctions issued by the secondary state’s courts based on a petition that the issuer is in a
hazardous financial condition, (d) allowing financial examinations according to NAIC standards
if the primary state’s insurance commissioner had not done so, (e) requiring non-discriminatory
participation in an insurance insolvency guaranty association, (f) requiring adherence to the
secondary state’s law relating to fraud and abuse and unfair claims settlement practices, and (g)
enforcing countersignature requirements by secondary state agents or brokers.
The Choice Act also requires that there be a process in place for external review in both the
secondary state and the primary state. If both states do not have relevant underlying laws or
regulations, then the issuer must provide an independent review mechanism substantially
identical to that of the NAIC’s Health Carrier External Review Model Act for all individuals
who purchase insurance coverage under the Choice Act, except that the reviewer or panel of
reviewers must meet requirements set out in the Act. 46
Senator McCain’s campaign proposal for the private market emphasized individual choice in the
purchase of health insurance coverage. Although the plan lacks detail, this author assumes it
would have had substantial similarities to the Choice Act. The McCain proposal sought to
harness competition to improve the quality of health insurance with greater variety to match
people's needs, lower prices, and portability and allow families to be able to purchase health
insurance nationwide, across state lines. Individuals who are not able to purchase insurance in
this new regulatory environment or who face much higher premiums would be able (under
Senator McCain’s proposal) to obtain coverage through a guaranteed access plan with a
limitation on premiums and subsidies for individuals with lower incomes. 47
We should note that many non-federal approaches to the same issue of incenting individual
choice of insurance product have been considered by state legislators. 48 Rhode Island, for
example, enacted a study bill this term that requires the Commissioner of Insurance to review the
laws and regulations of the state and its New England neighbors to: identify the changes
necessary to enable insurers licensed in other states to do business in Rhode Island without a
separate specific license; analyze the advantages and disadvantages of creating a regional health
insurance marketplace; examine the extent to which obtaining a license is a barrier for new
insurers to enter the market; and develop a proposed plan to implement a regional health
insurance marketplace. 49 Interstate Compacts may also provide a similar innovative approach,
by which states band together either in particular regions (such as Northeast, South, Midwest,
and West) or nationally. One example of this approach in another insurance context is the
Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission. Thirty-three states have adopted compact
legislation to establish the Commission which develops uniform national product standards and
serves as a central point of electronic filing for certain insurance products, including life
insurance, annuities, long-term care, and disability insurance. 50
III. Constitutional Issues
For purposes of this discussion, the proposals that would alter the law to allow individual health
insurance policies to be sold across state lines all effectively preserve the states’ primary
authority for the regulation of health insurance while allowing Congress to set standards that
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modify that authority. Those federal standards would have a formidable impact, as noted above,
on almost every aspect of state-regulated insurance markets, including mandates, guaranteed
issue laws, and community rating requirements.
As Congress sifts alternatives and attempts to craft health insurance reform, any PASL proposals
(such as the Choice Act and Senator McCain’s) present two overriding constitutional issues:


Whether the federal government has the authority to regulate insurance so as to limit the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.



Whether legislation allowing purchase of insurance across state lines could result in
impermissible commandeering of state regulatory and enforcement bodies in violation of
the constitutional prohibitions against commandeering.

This paper discusses each of these two issues in turn, as well as suggests possible solutions for
minimizing constitutional challenges.
A. Issue #1: Whether the federal government has the authority to regulate insurance so as
to limit the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
As noted above, the McCarran-Ferguson Act reaffirmed the power of the states to regulate and
tax insurers but allows federal law to trump state enactments if the law “specifically relates to the
business of insurance”:
“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance.” 51 (emphasis added)
Some have questioned whether Congress can curtail the states’ ability to regulate in their
respective individual insurance markets by enacting a PASL proposal. This author notes that a
review of the legislative history of HIPAA, which introduced significant federal regulation in
areas previously regulated solely by the states, reveals that the Congressional drafters did not feel
the need to amend McCarran-Ferguson before imposing federal rules on the individual market.
1. Supreme Court Test
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson sets out distinct guidelines for assessing whether
a federal statute overrides McCarran-Ferguson’s anti-preemption rule. 52 In Barnett, the Supreme
Court evaluated whether a 1916 federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in small
towns preempted a 1974 Florida statute prohibiting such banks from selling most types of
insurance.
In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court engaged in a two-stage
analysis to determine whether the federal statute preempted the state statute. First, it looked to
see whether under ordinary legal principles of preemption, the federal statute would preempt the
state statute. Finding no “express preemption” 53 and no “field preemption” 54 , the Court
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discussed whether federal and state statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict” based on the language
and purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act taken together.
It found that the federal and state statutes were not in irreconcilable conflict – as they would be if
the federal statute said “you must sell insurance” and the state statute said “you may not sell
insurance.” Rather, a federal statute authorized national banks to engage in activities that the
state statute expressly forbade. Florida maintained that the federal statute was intended to allow
the bank to sell insurance “only to the extent that state law also grants permission to do so.”
Rejecting that approach, the Court noted that “where Congress has not expressly conditioned the
grant of ‘power’ upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no such
condition applies,” and concluded that under ordinary principles of preemption, the federal law
preempts the state’s prohibitory statute.
The Court went onto to evaluate whether the McCarran-Ferguson special anti-preemption rule
governed, and formulated a three part test to examine whether a federal statute “specifically
relates to the business of insurance.” First, it examined whether the law “relates” to the business
of insurance, based on its historically broad interpretation of the term “relates” (giving as an
example the “relates” to language in the ERISA preemption clause as analyzed in Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux 55 ) and concluded that “[i]n ordinary English, a statute that says that banks may
act as insurance agents, and that the Comptroller of the Currency may regulate their insurancerelated activities, ‘relates’ to the insurance business.” 56
Second, the Court looked at the more “important” issue of whether the statute “specifically”
relates to the insurance business. In a plain language analysis, the Court distinguished between
“implicit” and “explicit” references and contrasted the general term “business activity” with an
explicit reference to “finance, banking, and insurance.”
The third element of its analysis concerned whether the statute specifically relates to the
“business of insurance,” with the Court noting that the statute not only focused on industryspecific selling practices, but also “affects the relation of insured to insurer and the spreading of
risk – matters that this Court in other contexts, has placed at the core of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act’s concern.” (preceding cites omitted).
In sum, the court in Barnett confirmed that there is no need for there to be express statutory
language in a federal statute to allow it to trump state law “regulating the business of insurance”
additionally noted that this analysis does not require specific language such as “state law is
preempted” or the like to fall within the McCarran-Ferguson Act exception.
2. Solutions for Minimizing McCarran-Ferguson Challenges
In the event that PASL proposal or a variation is considered by Congress, its sponsors could
minimize concerns about a challenge to the federal government’s authority to enact such a
proposal by taking the following two steps:
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a) State clearly that the Congress intends to regulate interstate commerce through the
legislation. The drafters should clearly invoke interstate commerce jurisdiction, as courts
traditionally have been very deferential to the Congress when evaluating whether the
federal government has interstate commerce jurisdiction.
The very reason for the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was the Supreme Court’s
expansive holding, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., that “[n]o commercial
enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly
beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an
exception of the business of insurance.” 57
While the specific lines of the Commerce Clause have shifted over the years, there appears little
doubt of Congress’s power to regulate insurance, even if certain insurance activities were viewed
as solely intrastate. 58 Any judicial review of a statute would be subject to only “rational basis”
analysis. 59
The Health Care Choice Act of 2007 included a specification of constitutional authority under
the Commerce Clause: “This Act is enacted pursuant to the power granted Congress under article
I, section 8, clause 3, of the United States Constitution.” Additionally, the Act included a
findings section delineating the case for interstate commerce jurisdiction in order to set forth a
basis for finding a “rational” basis for the linkage. 60 The proposed legislation provided a
“roadmap” finding section, noting that (a) state law variations impact the ability of insurers to
offer and individuals to obtain affordable individual health coverage, thus impeding interstate
commerce; (b) the channels for offering coverage (Internet and mail) are part of interstate
commerce; (c) the appropriateness of increasing efficiency through a collaborative approach of
states; and (d) risk-retention groups as a successful model for sale of insurance across state lines.
This level of specification in federal legislation should prove sufficient to satisfy court scrutiny.
b) Ensuring that the legislation meets the standards of ordinary legal preemption in one of
three ways: (1) express preemption (stating that the law expressly preempts state laws on
the subject); (2) regulating the area so pervasively, that the law achieves “field
preemption;” or (3) establishing the type of conflict between federal and state laws so as to
establish a basis for “conflict preemption.”
In the case of a PASL proposal, the drafters can achieve the intended result through either
express preemption language or following the blueprint laid out by the court in Barnett Bank.
Any language should thus ensure that the legislation clearly (1) specifically; (2) relates; (3) to the
business of insurance. It does not appear that this test would be problematic for the Health Care
Choice Act of 2007 or the very similar McCain proposal. So long as the proposal explicitly
relates to “finance, banking, and insurance,” it will almost certainly satisfy the test. The Health
Care Choice Act of 2007 recognizes this and provides such specificity, for example, in the
findings section reproduced above. Likewise, the McCain proposal has an explicit statement:
“An important part of [the] plan is to use competition to improve the quality of health insurance
with greater variety to match people's needs, lower prices, and portability. Families should be
able to purchase health insurance nationwide, across state lines.” 61
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Second, because the term “relates to” is interpreted so broadly by the Court, any common-sense
link to insurance in the legislation will likely be satisfactory. Finally, the “business of insurance”
prong of the test is likely to be satisfied on its face by the current wording of either the Health
Care Choice Act of 2007 or a proposal by Senator McCain.
B. Issue #2: Whether a purchase of insurance across state lines proposal would result in
impermissible commandeering of state regulatory and enforcement bodies in violation of
constitutional prohibitions against commandeering.
A second legal issue with PASL proposals such as the Choice Act is whether they improperly
require state insurance departments to enforce new federal standards. Some have argued that
state legislatures would specifically need to adopt these federal standards 62 to make them
enforceable under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, since the Supreme Court has held
that “Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.” 63
The Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering language provides: “The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” 64 That language raises the following questions:


Although PASL proposals “at first glance” appear to retain regulatory authority and
responsibility with the primary state’s insurance commissioner and not compel new
functions, would the primary state’s insurance commissioner be considered to be
“commandeered” because the commissioner would now have the added duty of enforcing
standards for state licensed insurers issuing policies to insureds residing in other states? 65



Would a secondary state’s insurance commissioner be considered to be “commandeered”
by virtue of being required to monitor the financial conditions of out-of-state insurers
selling insurance to the secondary state’s residents? 66



Would recordkeeping imposed by such proposals – such as requiring the completion of
federal forms certifying compliance with state law – be interpreted by a court as
commandeering? 67

1. Supreme Court’s Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
The leading case on “commandeering” is Printz v. United States. 68 There, chief law enforcement
officers for counties in Montana and Arizona challenged the constitutionality of interim
provisions of the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that directed state law
enforcement officers to participate in the administration of a federally-enacted regulatory
scheme. The legislation required the chief law enforcement officer of each local jurisdiction to
conduct background checks of handgun purchasers until such time as a national system was in
place.

O’NEILL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW
GEORGETOWN LAW | 600 NEW JERSEY AVENUE NW | WASHINGTON, DC 20001
www.oneillinstitute.org
14

Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned that requirement in a 5-4 decision with an opinion
delivered by Justice Scalia:
We held in New York 69 that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce
a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent
that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not
whether policymaking is involved, and no case by case weighing of the burdens
or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our
constitutional system of dual sovereignty. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. 70
The door does not seem to be shut, on the other hand, for a reading that “voluntary compliance”
by states or use of the spending power to urge state participation may pass muster. Justice
O'Connor's concurrence supports that view, especially coupled with the four dissenters' analysis
that the Brady Act provisions were constitutional:
Our holding, of course, does not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act.
States and chief law enforcement officers may voluntarily continue to participate
in the federal program. Moreover, the directives to the States are merely interim
provisions scheduled to terminate November 30, 1998. Congress is also free to
amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis
with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs. 71
(citations omitted)
Another Supreme Court case may shed some additional light on how courts could evaluate a
PASL proposal, if elements of a bill were deemed to regulate state activities as opposed to the
actions of private parties. In Reno v. Condon, South Carolina and its attorney general challenged
the constitutionality of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), which limits the
ability of states to release a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent. 72 The
Supreme Court held that the Act was a proper exercise of the authority of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, the Court distinguished Printz
because the DPPA did not require state officials to enforce federal law in violation of the Tenth
Amendment, but instead regulated the state as an owner of a database rather than attempting to
control or influence the manner in which states regulated private parties.
2. Strategies for Minimizing Anti-Commandeering Challenges
In the event that a PASL bill is considered by Congress, its sponsors could minimize concerns
about an anti-commandeering challenge to the Federal government’s authority to enact this
proposal by taking the following steps:
a) Make the best case possible that any responsibilities modified as the result of the
legislation do not impose “new” duties on state officials. The drafters could characterize
the choice of law rule as an exercise of federal preemption power under the Supremacy
Clause. Drafters could be mindful of characterizing the duties of primary and secondary
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state officials as consistent with already-existing duties of the official. Any additional
actions could thus be characterized as not constituting direct compulsion of the state
officials. 73 Another approach might be to characterize the participation of states as “primary
states” in the program as a voluntary effort. 74
b) Provide new funding to the states from the federal government to establish spending
power authority to incentivize states to participate in the program. One option to
consider would be to provide the states with federal dollars or incentives to participate in the
program. Congress’ spending power is broad, but not unlimited. It is subject to the
following restrictions: (1) the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of "the
general welfare;" (2) if Congress desires to condition the states' receipt of federal funds, it
must do so unambiguously so that the states can exercise their choice knowingly; (3) there
must be a relationship "to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs"; and
(4) no other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional
grant of federal funds. 75
Conclusion
The various proposals to allow individuals to purchase and insurers to sell insurance across state
lines are motivated by the laudatory goals of making health insurance more affordable by
increasing competition among health insurers, giving consumers more choices of products and
companies, and minimizing costs of duplicative or unnecessary regulation by 51 different
regulators with varying rules. The constitutional difficulties appear to be surmountable if
legislation is drafted properly. But the practical difficulties of such an approach are legion.
Fundamentally, by overturning the traditional paradigm of solely state-regulated insurance
products, PASL proposals of all stripes create difficulties in determining what was heretofore a
simple question: “Where does the policy live?” The shift will necessarily impact all kinds of
state assessments on insurers. For example, over 30 states have implemented high-risk health
pools, which are nonprofit organizations created by state law to offer health insurance to
individuals who otherwise would be unable to secure coverage. Because the premiums collected
from participants in these pools fund only about 58% of costs, however, the vast majority assess
health insurers for at least a portion of the pools’ funding, with formulas based on revenue
generated in the state or on market share in the state. 76 Yet those funding mechanisms may be
difficult to sustain in a state where consumers choose to “vote with their feet” and purchase
policies issued in another state.
There are additional practical problems about how PASL proposals would impact the myriad
areas of extensive state-based regulation of not only insurers but also others working with them
in the chain, such as state rules relating to licensing of brokers and/or agents, prompt pay
requirements for providers, and provider adequacy and network requirements. Thus, how can
Maryland require a Colorado-based insurer to comply with Maryland network adequacy rules?
Should state prompt-pay requirements be enforced based on the residence of the consumer or
based on where the provider service is rendered? Any federal PASL proposal would need to
contemplate how to address these difficult issues, and many papers have been published arguing
the pros and cons of allowing consumers to buy insurance from outside their domicile state, and
proposing variations on PASL proposals. 77
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This paper has outlined a variety of other legal and practical issues that arise from a federal
PASL proposal, many of which have been raised and vigorously discussed by consumer
advocates, insurance commissioners, and academics. Perhaps the overriding issue is how PASL
proposals –which impact only the individual market – would fit within what seems to be a
broader national effort to reform the health care system in terms of both access and affordability.
PASL proposals in essence attempt to simplify only one element of the health insurance
regulation, by eliminating comprehensive (and often duplicative and variable) state-by-state
regulation, while leaving in its place arguably less comprehensive regulation that may also be
less protective of individuals from the “primary state.” As the CBO has noted, these proposals
may drive healthy individuals currently insured by employer-based coverage to opt for
individual, less expensive coverage purchased from another state, leaving sicker and more
expensive workers in the group coverage. 78 Broader efforts at reform that address all markets –
individual, group, and government-regulated – may be the better approach to reform.
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